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Abstract
This paper investigates the welfare effects of international trade when technological
idiosyncratic risk is distorted by optimistic and pessimistic managers. We show that free
trade always improves the ex−ante welfare but sometimes lowers the ex−post welfare. Free
trade commitment can be regretted ex−post.
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1. Introduction 
As already shown by Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Shy (1988), technological uncertainty 
can damage the normative theorem of international trade. More precisely, they show that free 
trade can lower the ex-ante welfare when global risk is negatively correlated between 
countries. Under the assumption of global risk, the ex-post welfare analysis poses problem 
because ex-post welfare is different in each state of nature.  
We depart from these frameworks by introducing idiosyncratic risk without an insurance 
market. Since the law of large numbers applies, it is possible to eliminate the macroeconomic 
uncertainty on ex-post welfare. Hence, it now makes sense to analyse the effect of 
international trade on ex-post welfare. Moreover, we assume that managers misperceive 
probabilities following Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Consequently both pessimistic and 
optimistic managers are allowed in this paper whereas Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Shy 
(1988) consider only risk averse managers.  
The dual theory of choice under risk introduced by Yaari (1987) is useful to deal with how the 
perceived risk of managers is processed into production choice. Then, the interaction of 
production uncertainty and psychology gives the basis for trade as long as one country is 
relatively more optimistic than the other. From the normative point of view, free trade always 
improves  ex-ante  welfare but sometimes lowers ex-post welfare. Moreover lump-sum 
transfers are not always possible since the word as a whole can be worse off with the opening 
of trade. 
2. The model 
There are two countries indexed by O and P. Each country has a continuum of managers 
indexed on the interval [] 1 , 0  who have to choose exclusively
1 between two production 
project C and R. Project C is certain and provides one unit of commodity C. Project R is risky 
since it provides one unit of commodity R with probability θ and 0 with probability 1-θ. 
Managers who choose the risky project will be called entrepreneurs. 
Risk is idiosyncratic to each manager’s project rather than global
2. Even though the 
probability of success θ is well-known, managers tend to distort the objective probability. 
This psychological bias leads them to overestimate or underestimate the chance that their 
project will be successful. In fact entrepreneurs may choose risky activities because they 
exhibit more optimism than others. This saying is supported by empirical findings. Among 
others, Cooper, Dunkelberg and Woo (1988) test this assumption and find that 68% of 
entrepreneurs perceive their prospects for success better than those for similar business. 
Moreover it seems that entrepreneurs do not learn from experiences. In fact, as quoted by 
Ross and Anderson (1982), such beliefs tend to persist because people care about their self 
esteem. Like other people, entrepreneur could be reluctant to memorize ego-threatening 
information. At best, Bayesian revision is incomplete as in Benabou and Tirole (2002). 
                                                 
1 Moskovitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) point out that entrepreneurial investment is very concentrated. This 
lack of diversification is very puzzling because the return of entrepreneurship tends to be low when controlling 
for risk. 
2 As quoted by Judd (1985), there are some difficulties with the application of the law of large numbers in a 
continuum. However, we follow here the tradition of economic literature which explicitly or implicitly avoids 
this difficulty. See for instance Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or Lucas and Prescott (1974).   2
In each country, managers have the same perception of risk. Following Yaari (1987), the 
objective probability is distorted by managers and their subjective probability of success is 
given by  J g ) i ( g = ,  [] 1 , 0 i∈ ∀  and  P , 0 J = . Let Γ denote the Yaari preference function 
which is linear in income. Given  R w  and  C w , respectively the income provided by the risky 
and the certain project, then we have  R w ) i ( g ) R ( × = Γ and  C w ) C ( = Γ .  
Decision rule:  manager i chooses the risky project if:  
C R w w ) i ( g ) C ( ) R ( > × ⇔ Γ > Γ . 
The two countries are identical except that managers have different perceptions of risk. Let 
θ = δ J J g  denote the degree of optimism. Country J is optimistic if  1 J > δ  and pessimistic if 
1 J < δ . It is assumed that  P O δ > δ : managers in country O are relatively more optimistic than 
in country P. Commodity C is the numéraire so p refers to the relative price of commodity R 
in terms of commodity C. Aggregate demand functions for the two commodities have unitary 
price and income elasticities and b denotes the share of income devoted to the consumption of 
commodity R :  J CJ y ) b 1 ( d − =  and  p by d J RJ =  where  J y  is the aggregate income of 
country J. 
Welfare analysis is based on two criteria. Before the resolution of uncertainty, the aggregate 
welfare depends on  ) y ~ ( E J  i.e. the expected income of managers given their perception of 
risk. Since the Yaari preference function is linear in income, the ex-ante welfare of country J 
is  () b
J J J p y ~ KE V − = , where K is a positive constant  ( ) 0 b 1 b K
b 1 b > − =
− . After the 
resolution of uncertainty, the aggregate welfare depends on  J y  i.e. the effective income of 
country J. Then, the ex-post welfare of country J is 
b
J J J p Ky U
− = . This distinction is useful 
to explain why a country can regret ex-post a free trade commitment based on the ex-ante 
welfare analysis. 
3. Autarky equilibrium 
Since decision is made before the resolution of uncertainty, managers have to anticipate the 
level of earnings provided by each production project. This is possible as long as the 
perception of risk (i.e.  J g ) and the objective probability θ are common knowledge. Then, the 
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Equation (1) gives the relative wage after resolution of uncertainty since  1 wCJ =  and 
a
J RJ p w = . Equation (2) states that managers are indifferent between C and R if the expected 
wages delivered by each project are equal. The relative price of commodity R which equals 
demand and supply of commodity R is given by equation (3) where 
a
J n  refers to the 
proportion of managers choosing commodity R. These managers become entrepreneurs. 
 The relative price of commodity R can be found by substituting  RJ CJ w w  from (2) into (1). 
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J g K V =  since  1 p g ) y ~ ( E a
J J
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= . One can check that ex-post welfare is optimal if managers are realist i.e. 
1 J = δ .  
The psychological bias induces a distortion in autarky: a country suffers from an 
entrepreneurship deficit if managers are pessimistic but from an entrepreneurship surplus as 
well if managers are optimistic. This result is very similar to Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) 
who emphasizes the welfare impact of an entrepreneurship deficit with risk averse managers. 
More interestingly, we show that optimism is by no mean a better behaviour since an 
entrepreneurship surplus is suboptimal as well.  
3. Free trade 
3.1. Comparative advantage and the psychological bias 
International differences in managers’ perception of risk give a basis for international trade. 
Since country O is relatively more optimistic than country P, the comparison of autarky prices 




O p p δ > δ ⇔ < : country O and country P will specialize in commodity R and C 








RO d d y y + = + . When both countries are completely specialized, we obtain 
θ × −
=
) b 1 (
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O = θ = .  
But demand conditions make countries completely or incompletely specialized. 
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3.2. The effect of free trade on welfare 
If we convert the ratio of welfare in free trade to welfare in autarky to logarithmic form, the 






















J PE IE ) p p ln( b ) y y ln( ) U U ln( + = − = .                  (Ex-post analysis) 
Where PEJ refers to the Price Effect induced by the opening of trade. The magnitude of PEJ is 
the same whatever the welfare is measured before or after the resolution of uncertainty (see 
Appendix A). The price effect is negative for country O (
a
O




* ≤ .  
On the contrary, the ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of the income effect are not equal. 
The ex-ante income effect, which depends on the expected income, is given by:  










O O = = = = , 
since  1 p g ) y ~ ( E a
J J
a




O p g ) y ~ ( E =  and  1 ) y ~ ( E
*
P = .  
The ex-post evaluations of IEJ are synthesized in Appendix A. 
The effect of free trade on ex-ante welfare 
Differences in autarky prices are driven by the perception of risk in each country. Before the 
resolution of uncertainty, trade is expected to improve welfare because the differences in the 
perception of risk act as if productivities were not identical between countries. Hence, ex-ante 
welfare increases thanks to traditional gains from specialization and managers would clearly 
lobby in favour of a free trade commitment. 
Proposition 1 The opening of trade improves the ex-ante welfare of both countries. 
Proof   Immediate for country P since ex-ante income is not affected by trade and price effect 
is positive. The ex-ante welfare of country O improves as well since the income effect 





J ≥ − = − .■ 
The effect of free trade on ex-post welfare 
Free trade can reduce the ex-post distortion induced by the managers’ perception of risk. 
When both countries are pessimistic (optimistic), free trade tends to increase (reduce) the 
entrepreneurship deficit (surplus) in the relatively less pessimistic (optimistic) country O 
(country P). In these cases, consumer’s ex-post welfare raises whatever demand conditions 
are. 
Proposition 2 The opening of trade improves the ex-post welfare of country O (resp. country 
P)  if managers are pessimistic (resp. optimistic). 
Proof  See Appendix B.   5
Proposition 3 The opening of trade does not always increase ex-post welfare. One country 
can be worse off after trade. Moreover, the world as a whole can be worse off with trade. 
Hence lump-sum transfers cannot always make both countries better off. 
Numerical simulations provided in Appendix C show that the opening of trade does not 
ensure mutual ex-post gains from trade even if complete specialization prevails in both 
countries. Hence, gains from specialization are not always strong enough to outweigh the 
psychological bias. A country can regret free trade commitment when it is based on ex-ante 
welfare analysis.  
Simulation 1 (i.e.  8 O = δ  and  2 P = δ ) describes the case of a worldwide optimism. When all 
managers are optimistic, the relative price of commodity R is not high enough to reward the 
risk and entrepreneurs have ex-post regret. Therefore, it is the country that ends up 
specializing in the risky activity (i.e. the more optimistic country) that is likely to lose from 
trade. The reversed case of a worldwide pessimism is illustrated by simulation 2 (i.e. 
8 . 0 O = δ  and  2 . 0 P = δ ). In equilibrium, the relative price of commodity R is now so high that 
managers in the certain activity do suffer ex-post regret. Therefore, the pessimistic country 
specialized in the certain commodity is likely to lose from trade. A third case is pointed out 
where there is an optimistic country ( 4 O = δ ) and a pessimistic country ( 5 . 0 P = δ ). This case 
is more complicated because country O or country P might loose from trade. Which country is 
likely to have ex-post regret depends on demand conditions since each country would benefit 
from a large demand for the commodity they specialize in. Precisely, simulation 3 shows that 
country O is worse off after trade if the demand for commodity R is low ( 4 . 0 b < ) while 
country P is worse off the demand for commodity R is high ( 53 . 0 b > ).  
Moreover, the increase in welfare of one country does not always outweigh the decrease 
experimented by the other: the world can be worse off with trade. According to the Hicksian 
compensation theory, the compensated income RJ is such that country J achieves the same 
level of utility given the price change from 
a p t o  



















J y y p p R − × =  for each  P , 0 J =  and the world welfare decreases when 
0 R
J
J > ∑ . For example, when  3 O = δ  and  5 . 1 P = δ , the world welfare decreases if 
275 . 0 b = . In this case, specializations are complete and we have 29 . 0 R0 =   25 . 0 R P − =  so 
0 04 . 0 R
J
J > = ∑ .  
4. Conclusion 
When trade is driven by a psychological bias, ex-ante analysis and ex-post analysis can lead to 
opposite assessment. We showed that free trade always improves the ex-ante welfare but 
sometimes lowers the ex-post welfare. Free trade can amplify the autarky distortions whatever 
induced by optimism or pessimism. These results have policy implications. If free trade 
commitment is based on ex-ante welfare, it appears that a country can regret this decision 
when ex-post welfare will decrease. This opens the door to protectionism unless this is a way 
to correct the psychological bias.   6
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Appendix 
A. Income effect (IE) and price effect (PE) resulting from the opening of trade  
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B. Proof of proposition 2 
When managers are optimistic ( 1 P O > δ > δ ), the price effect and the income effect are both 
positive for country P (see Appendix A). Therefore, country P is better off with the opening of 
trade. 
When managers are pessimistic ( 1 O P < δ < δ ), let us show that the income effect of country 
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For any given b,  ) ( h O δ  is decreasing in  O δ  on the interval]] 1 , 0 . 
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Moreover, for all  ][ 1 , 0 b∈  we have  . 0 ) 1 ( h ≥  





≤  we have  0 ) 1 ( h = . 















implies that  5 . 0 b >  when  1 O < δ . 





≥  we have  0 ln b) - (1 ) 1 ( h P > δ − =  since  1 O P < δ < δ . 
This establishes that  ) ( h O δ  is strictly decreasing and positive on the interval][ 1 , 0 . ■ 
C. Numerical illustrations 
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